CWE-607 Variante Rascunho

Public Static Final Field References Mutable Object

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not,…

Definição

What is CWE-607?

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not, malicious code or even accidental code in other packages can modify the object's contents, violating the intended immutability.
The core issue is a misunderstanding of the `final` keyword in Java and similar languages. When applied to an object reference, `final` only guarantees that the reference itself cannot be reassigned to point to a different object. It does not protect the internal state of the object that the reference points to. If that object is mutable—like an array, a collection, or a custom class with public setters—its data can be freely altered, even through the `static final` field. To prevent this, developers must ensure true immutability. This involves either assigning the static final field to an inherently immutable object (like a `String` or a boxed primitive) or defensively wrapping mutable objects. For collections, use `Collections.unmodifiableList()`, `Map.copyOf()`, or similar methods to create an unmodifiable view or a deep copy before assignment. This practice encapsulates the mutable data and enforces the read-only intent of the public static field.
Impacto no mundo real

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-607

Ainda não há referências CVE públicas associadas a este CWE no catálogo da MITRE.

Como os atacantes a exploram

Trajeto do atacante passo a passo

  1. 1

    Identificar um caminho de código que trata input não confiável sem validação.

  2. 2

    Criar um payload que explora o comportamento inseguro — injeção, traversal, overflow ou abuso de lógica.

  3. 3

    Entregar o payload através de um pedido normal e observar a reação da aplicação.

  4. 4

    Iterar até que a resposta exponha dados, execute código do atacante ou escale privilégios.

Exemplo de código vulnerável

Vulnerable Java

Here, an array (which is inherently mutable) is labeled public static final.

Vulnerável Java
public static final String[] USER_ROLES;
Exemplo de código seguro

Secure pseudo

Seguro pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Lista de verificação de prevenção

How to prevent CWE-607

  • Implementation Protect mutable objects by making them private. Restrict access to the getter and setter as well.
Sinais de deteção

How to detect CWE-607

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-607

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Perguntas frequentes

Frequently asked questions

O que é o CWE-607?

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not, malicious code or even accidental code in other packages can modify the object's contents, violating the intended immutability.

Qual a gravidade do CWE-607?

A MITRE não publicou uma classificação de probabilidade de exploração para esta fraqueza. Trate-a como impacto médio até o seu modelo de ameaças provar o contrário.

Que linguagens ou plataformas são afetadas pelo CWE-607?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Java.

Como posso prevenir o CWE-607?

Protect mutable objects by making them private. Restrict access to the getter and setter as well.

Como é que o Plexicus deteta e corrige o CWE-607?

O motor SAST do Plexicus correlaciona a assinatura de fluxo de dados do CWE-607 em cada commit. Quando é encontrada uma correspondência, o nosso agente Codex Remedium abre um PR de correção com o código corrigido, testes e um resumo de uma linha para o revisor.

Onde posso saber mais sobre o CWE-607?

A MITRE publica a definição canónica em https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/607.html. Pode também consultar a documentação da OWASP e do NIST para orientações adjacentes.

Pronto para validar o que importa?

Pronto para validar o que importa.

O Plexicus é Proof-Driven AppSec: achados validados, compreensão contextual e remediação revisada — ancorada em evidência, escopada com você.

Qualificação

Verifique se o AI Swarm Pentest se adequa ao seu ambiente.

Partilhe o contexto mínimo. Vamos rever o escopo e indicar o próximo passo comercial.

Antes de enviar — verifique se se encaixa

0 / 280

Sem compromisso. Se não se encaixa, dizemos.

SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorized target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
  • Executive briefing
  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)
Ronda privada Para investidores