CWE-329 Variante Rascunho Medium likelihood

Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode

This vulnerability occurs when software uses a predictable or reused Initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption. Predictable IVs undermine the security of CBC,…

Definição

What is CWE-329?

This vulnerability occurs when software uses a predictable or reused Initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption. Predictable IVs undermine the security of CBC, making encrypted data vulnerable to dictionary and chosen-plaintext attacks, especially when the same key is used multiple times.
CBC mode improves upon basic ECB encryption by ensuring identical plaintext blocks encrypt to different ciphertext blocks. It achieves this by XOR-ing the first plaintext block with a unique, random Initialization Vector (IV) before encryption, and then chaining each subsequent block with the previous ciphertext. This process breaks patterns in the plaintext. However, if the IV is predictable or reused, this core security mechanism fails. When an attacker can guess or calculate the IV, they can launch practical attacks. Even if IVs aren't identical, predictable sequences allow attackers to perform chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA), where they analyze differences between known inputs and resulting ciphertexts to deduce the encryption key or decrypt data. Always generate IVs using a cryptographically secure random number generator for each encryption operation to maintain CBC's security guarantees.
Impacto no mundo real

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-329

  • encryption functionality in an authentication framework uses a fixed null IV with CBC mode, allowing attackers to decrypt traffic in applications that use this functionality

  • messages for a door-unlocking product use a fixed IV in CBC mode, which is the same after each restart

  • application uses AES in CBC mode, but the pseudo-random secret and IV are generated using math.random, which is not cryptographically strong.

  • Blowfish-CBC implementation constructs an IV where each byte is calculated modulo 8 instead of modulo 256, resulting in less than 12 bits for the effective IV length, and less than 4096 possible IV values.

  • BEAST attack in SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0. In CBC mode, chained initialization vectors are non-random, allowing decryption of HTTPS traffic using a chosen plaintext attack.

Como os atacantes a exploram

Trajeto do atacante passo a passo

  1. 1

    Identificar um caminho de código que trata input não confiável sem validação.

  2. 2

    Criar um payload que explora o comportamento inseguro — injeção, traversal, overflow ou abuso de lógica.

  3. 3

    Entregar o payload através de um pedido normal e observar a reação da aplicação.

  4. 4

    Iterar até que a resposta exponha dados, execute código do atacante ou escale privilégios.

Exemplo de código vulnerável

Vulnerable C

In the following examples, CBC mode is used when encrypting data:

Vulnerável C
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
  char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
  char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
  RAND_bytes(key, b);
  memset(iv,0,EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
  EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx,EVP_bf_cbc(), key,iv);
Exemplo de código seguro

Secure pseudo

Seguro pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Lista de verificação de prevenção

How to prevent CWE-329

  • Implementation NIST recommends two methods of generating unpredictable IVs for CBC mode [REF-1172]. The first is to generate the IV randomly. The second method is to encrypt a nonce with the same key and cipher to be used to encrypt the plaintext. In this case the nonce must be unique but can be predictable, since the block cipher will act as a pseudo random permutation.
Sinais de deteção

How to detect CWE-329

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-329

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Perguntas frequentes

Frequently asked questions

O que é o CWE-329?

This vulnerability occurs when software uses a predictable or reused Initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption. Predictable IVs undermine the security of CBC, making encrypted data vulnerable to dictionary and chosen-plaintext attacks, especially when the same key is used multiple times.

Qual a gravidade do CWE-329?

A MITRE classifica a probabilidade de exploração como Média — a exploração é realista mas normalmente requer condições específicas.

Que linguagens ou plataformas são afetadas pelo CWE-329?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: ICS/OT.

Como posso prevenir o CWE-329?

NIST recommends two methods of generating unpredictable IVs for CBC mode [REF-1172]. The first is to generate the IV randomly. The second method is to encrypt a nonce with the same key and cipher to be used to encrypt the plaintext. In this case the nonce must be unique but can be predictable, since the block cipher will act as a pseudo random permutation.

Como é que o Plexicus deteta e corrige o CWE-329?

O motor SAST do Plexicus correlaciona a assinatura de fluxo de dados do CWE-329 em cada commit. Quando é encontrada uma correspondência, o nosso agente Codex Remedium abre um PR de correção com o código corrigido, testes e um resumo de uma linha para o revisor.

Onde posso saber mais sobre o CWE-329?

A MITRE publica a definição canónica em https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/329.html. Pode também consultar a documentação da OWASP e do NIST para orientações adjacentes.

Pronto para validar o que importa?

Pronto para validar o que importa.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorized target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
  • Executive briefing
  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)
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