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CWE-1310 Base Rascunho
Missing Ability to Patch ROM Code
A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.
Definição
What is CWE-1310?
A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.
Many secure systems start by running foundational code from an immutable ROM, which establishes a hardware Root of Trust. Since this ROM code is permanently etched into the chip during manufacturing, any security flaws discovered after the device ships become permanent. This creates a critical, unchangeable weakness in every deployed unit.
Without a built-in patching capability for this ROM stage, the entire system remains vulnerable to exploitation. Attackers can target these unfixable flaws to compromise the boot process, potentially bypassing all subsequent security layers and taking full control of the SoC.
Impacto no mundo real
Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1310
Ainda não há referências CVE públicas associadas a este CWE no catálogo da MITRE.
Como os atacantes a exploram
Trajeto do atacante passo a passo
- 1
A System-on-Chip (SOC) implements a Root-of-Trust (RoT) in ROM to boot secure code. However, at times this ROM code might have security vulnerabilities and need to be patched. Since ROM is immutable, it can be impossible to patch.
- 2
ROM does not have built-in application-programming interfaces (APIs) to patch if the code is vulnerable. Implement mechanisms to patch the vulnerable ROM code.
- 3
The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.
- 4
The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396]. This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever. A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].
Exemplo de código vulnerável
Vulnerable Verilog
The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.
...
```
bootrom i_bootrom_patch (
.clk_i ,
.req_i ( rom_req ),
.addr_i ( rom_addr ),
.rdata_o ( rom_rdata_patch )
);
bootrom_linux i_bootrom_linux (
.clk_i ,
.req_i ( rom_req ),
.addr_i ( rom_addr ),
.rdata_o ( rom_rdata_linux )
);
```
assign rom_rdata = (ariane_boot_sel_i) ? rom_rdata_linux : rom_rdata_linux;**
... Exemplo de código seguro
Secure Verilog
The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396]. This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever. A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].
...
```
bootrom i_bootrom_patch (
.clk_i ,
.req_i ( rom_req ),
.addr_i ( rom_addr ),
.rdata_o ( rom_rdata_patch )
);
bootrom_linux i_bootrom_linux (
.clk_i ,
.req_i ( rom_req ),
.addr_i ( rom_addr ),
.rdata_o ( rom_rdata_linux )
);
```
assign rom_rdata = (ariane_boot_sel_i) ? rom_rdata_patch : rom_rdata_linux;**
... What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Lista de verificação de prevenção
How to prevent CWE-1310
- Architecture and Design / Implementation Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot.
- Architecture and Design / Implementation Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.
Sinais de deteção
How to detect CWE-1310
Executar testes dinâmicos de segurança de aplicações (DAST) contra o endpoint em execução.
Monitorizar os registos em tempo de execução para traços de exceção invulgares, input malformado ou tentativas de contornar a autorização.
Revisão de código: sinalizar qualquer novo código que trate input desta superfície sem usar os ajudantes validados do framework.
CWE-1310
Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.
Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.
Perguntas frequentes O que é o CWE-1310?
Qual a gravidade do CWE-1310?
Que linguagens ou plataformas são afetadas pelo CWE-1310?
Como posso prevenir o CWE-1310?
Como é que o Plexicus deteta e corrige o CWE-1310?
Onde posso saber mais sobre o CWE-1310?
Frequently asked questions
O que é o CWE-1310?
A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.
Qual a gravidade do CWE-1310?
A MITRE não publicou uma classificação de probabilidade de exploração para esta fraqueza. Trate-a como impacto médio até o seu modelo de ameaças provar o contrário.
Que linguagens ou plataformas são afetadas pelo CWE-1310?
MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, System on Chip.
Como posso prevenir o CWE-1310?
Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot. Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.
Como é que o Plexicus deteta e corrige o CWE-1310?
O motor SAST do Plexicus correlaciona a assinatura de fluxo de dados do CWE-1310 em cada commit. Quando é encontrada uma correspondência, o nosso agente Codex Remedium abre um PR de correção com o código corrigido, testes e um resumo de uma linha para o revisor.
Onde posso saber mais sobre o CWE-1310?
A MITRE publica a definição canónica em https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1310.html. Pode também consultar a documentação da OWASP e do NIST para orientações adjacentes.
Fraquezas relacionadas
Weaknesses related to CWE-1310
CWE-1329 Pai
Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable
This vulnerability occurs when a product depends on a component that cannot be updated or patched to fix security flaws or critical bugs.
CWE-1277 Irmão
Firmware Not Updateable
This vulnerability occurs when a hardware product lacks a mechanism for users to install firmware updates, leaving known security flaws…
Recursos
Further reading
- MITRE — CWE-1310 oficial https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1310.html
- riscv_peripherals.sv line 534 https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/75e5c0700b5a02e744f006fe8a09ff3c2ccdd32d/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/openpiton/riscv_peripherals.sv#L534
- Fix for riscv_peripherals.sv line 534 https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/cwe_1310_riscv_peripheral/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/openpiton/riscv_peripherals.sv#L534
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