CWE-364 Base Incompleto Medium likelihood

Signal Handler Race Condition

A signal handler race condition occurs when a program's signal handling routine is vulnerable to timing issues, allowing its state to be corrupted through asynchronous execution.

Definición

What is CWE-364?

A signal handler race condition occurs when a program's signal handling routine is vulnerable to timing issues, allowing its state to be corrupted through asynchronous execution.
Signal handlers are inherently risky because they can interrupt a program's normal execution at any point. If a handler modifies shared resources like global variables, uses non-reentrant functions (e.g., malloc, free, printf), or is registered for multiple signals, it can corrupt memory. This happens when the handler's actions clash with operations in the main code or other handlers, leading to use-after-free, double-free, or other memory corruption vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit for denial of service or code execution. To prevent these issues, design signal handlers to be minimal and reentrant. Avoid shared state, use only async-signal-safe functions, and consider blocking (masking) other signals within the handler to ensure atomicity. For resources that must be shared, implement proper synchronization or use a flag that the main program checks safely after the signal handler returns, moving complex logic out of the handler itself.
Impacto en el mundo real

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-364

  • Signal handler does not disable other signal handlers, allowing it to be interrupted, causing other functionality to access files/etc. with raised privileges

  • Attacker can send a signal while another signal handler is already running, leading to crash or execution with root privileges

  • unsafe calls to library functions from signal handler

  • SIGURG can be used to remotely interrupt signal handler; other variants exist

  • SIGCHLD signal to FTP server can cause crash under heavy load while executing non-reentrant functions like malloc/free.

Cómo lo explotan los atacantes

Ruta del atacante paso a paso

  1. 1

    This code registers the same signal handler function with two different signals (CWE-831). If those signals are sent to the process, the handler creates a log message (specified in the first argument to the program) and exits.

  2. 2

    The handler function uses global state (globalVar and logMessage), and it can be called by both the SIGHUP and SIGTERM signals. An attack scenario might follow these lines:

  3. 3

    - The program begins execution, initializes logMessage, and registers the signal handlers for SIGHUP and SIGTERM. - The program begins its "normal" functionality, which is simplified as sleep(), but could be any functionality that consumes some time. - The attacker sends SIGHUP, which invokes handler (call this "SIGHUP-handler"). - SIGHUP-handler begins to execute, calling syslog(). - syslog() calls malloc(), which is non-reentrant. malloc() begins to modify metadata to manage the heap. - The attacker then sends SIGTERM. - SIGHUP-handler is interrupted, but syslog's malloc call is still executing and has not finished modifying its metadata. - The SIGTERM handler is invoked. - SIGTERM-handler records the log message using syslog(), then frees the logMessage variable.

  4. 4

    At this point, the state of the heap is uncertain, because malloc is still modifying the metadata for the heap; the metadata might be in an inconsistent state. The SIGTERM-handler call to free() is assuming that the metadata is inconsistent, possibly causing it to write data to the wrong location while managing the heap. The result is memory corruption, which could lead to a crash or even code execution, depending on the circumstances under which the code is running.

  5. 5

    Note that this is an adaptation of a classic example as originally presented by Michal Zalewski [REF-360]; the original example was shown to be exploitable for code execution.

Ejemplo de código vulnerable

Vulnerable C

This code registers the same signal handler function with two different signals (CWE-831). If those signals are sent to the process, the handler creates a log message (specified in the first argument to the program) and exits.

Vulnerable C
char *logMessage;
  void handler (int sigNum) {
  		syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s\n", logMessage);
  		free(logMessage);
```
/* artificially increase the size of the timing window to make demonstration of this weakness easier. */* 
  		
  		sleep(10);
  		exit(0);}
  
  int main (int argc, char* argv[]) {
  ```
  		logMessage = strdup(argv[1]);
```
/* Register signal handlers. */* 
  		
  		signal(SIGHUP, handler);
  		signal(SIGTERM, handler);
  		
  		 */* artificially increase the size of the timing window to make demonstration of this weakness easier. */* 
  		
  		sleep(10);}
Ejemplo de código seguro

Secure pseudo

Seguro pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Lista de prevención

How to prevent CWE-364

  • Requirements Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • Architecture and Design Design signal handlers to only set flags, rather than perform complex functionality. These flags can then be checked and acted upon within the main program loop.
  • Implementation Only use reentrant functions within signal handlers. Also, use validation to ensure that state is consistent while performing asynchronous actions that affect the state of execution.
Señales de detección

How to detect CWE-364

SAST High

Ejecuta análisis estático (SAST) sobre el código buscando el patrón inseguro en el flujo de datos.

DAST Moderate

Ejecuta pruebas dinámicas de seguridad de aplicaciones (DAST) contra el endpoint en vivo.

Runtime Moderate

Vigila los logs en tiempo de ejecución para detectar trazas de excepción inusuales, entradas malformadas o intentos de bypass de autorización.

Code review Moderate

Revisión de código: marca cualquier código nuevo que maneje entrada desde esta superficie sin usar los helpers validados del framework.

CWE-364

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Preguntas frecuentes

Frequently asked questions

¿Qué es CWE-364?

A signal handler race condition occurs when a program's signal handling routine is vulnerable to timing issues, allowing its state to be corrupted through asynchronous execution.

¿Qué gravedad tiene CWE-364?

MITRE califica la probabilidad de explotación como Media — la explotación es realista pero suele requerir condiciones específicas.

¿Qué lenguajes o plataformas se ven afectados por CWE-364?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: C, C++.

¿Cómo puedo prevenir CWE-364?

Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Design signal handlers to only set flags, rather than perform complex functionality. These flags can then be checked and acted upon within the main program loop.

¿Cómo detecta y corrige Plexicus CWE-364?

El motor SAST de Plexicus detecta la firma de flujo de datos para CWE-364 en cada commit. Cuando hay coincidencia, nuestro agente Codex Remedium abre un PR de corrección con el código corregido, las pruebas y un resumen de una línea para el revisor.

¿Dónde puedo aprender más sobre CWE-364?

MITRE publica la definición canónica en https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/364.html. También puedes consultar la documentación de OWASP y NIST para guías relacionadas.

Debilidades relacionadas

Weaknesses related to CWE-364

CWE-362 Padre

Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

A race condition occurs when multiple processes or threads access a shared resource simultaneously without proper coordination, creating a…

CWE-1223 Hermano

Race Condition for Write-Once Attributes

This vulnerability occurs when an untrusted software component wins a race condition and writes to a hardware register before the trusted…

CWE-1298 Hermano

Hardware Logic Contains Race Conditions

A hardware race condition occurs when security-critical logic circuits receive signals at slightly different times, creating temporary…

CWE-366 Hermano

Race Condition within a Thread

This vulnerability occurs when two or more threads within the same application access and manipulate a shared resource (like a variable,…

CWE-367 Hermano

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

This vulnerability occurs when a program verifies a resource's state (like a file's permissions or existence) but then uses it after that…

CWE-368 Hermano

Context Switching Race Condition

This vulnerability occurs when an application switches between different security contexts (like privilege levels or domains) using a…

CWE-421 Hermano

Race Condition During Access to Alternate Channel

A race condition occurs when an application opens a secondary communication channel intended for an authorized user, but fails to secure…

CWE-689 Hermano

Permission Race Condition During Resource Copy

This vulnerability occurs when a system copies a file or resource but delays setting its final permissions until the entire copy operation…

CWE-415 Puede preceder

Double Free

A double free vulnerability occurs when a program mistakenly calls the 'free()' function twice on the same block of memory.

¿Listo para validar lo que importa?

Listo para validar lo que importa.

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Calificación

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorized target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
  • Executive briefing
  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)
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