Ejecuta análisis estático (SAST) sobre el código buscando el patrón inseguro en el flujo de datos.
CWE-1310 Base Borrador
Missing Ability to Patch ROM Code
A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.
Definición
What is CWE-1310?
A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.
Many secure systems start by running foundational code from an immutable ROM, which establishes a hardware Root of Trust. Since this ROM code is permanently etched into the chip during manufacturing, any security flaws discovered after the device ships become permanent. This creates a critical, unchangeable weakness in every deployed unit.
Without a built-in patching capability for this ROM stage, the entire system remains vulnerable to exploitation. Attackers can target these unfixable flaws to compromise the boot process, potentially bypassing all subsequent security layers and taking full control of the SoC.
Impacto en el mundo real
Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1310
Todavía no hay CVEs públicos enlazados a esta CWE en el catálogo de MITRE.
Cómo lo explotan los atacantes
Ruta del atacante paso a paso
- 1
A System-on-Chip (SOC) implements a Root-of-Trust (RoT) in ROM to boot secure code. However, at times this ROM code might have security vulnerabilities and need to be patched. Since ROM is immutable, it can be impossible to patch.
- 2
ROM does not have built-in application-programming interfaces (APIs) to patch if the code is vulnerable. Implement mechanisms to patch the vulnerable ROM code.
- 3
The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.
- 4
The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396]. This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever. A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].
Ejemplo de código vulnerable
Vulnerable Verilog
The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.The example code is taken from the SoC peripheral wrapper inside the buggy OpenPiton SoC of HACK@DAC'21. The wrapper is used for connecting the communications between SoC peripherals, such as crypto-engines, direct memory access (DMA), reset controllers, JTAG, etc. The secure implementation of the SoC wrapper should allow users to boot from a ROM for Linux (i_bootrom_linux) or from a patchable ROM (i_bootrom_patch) if the Linux bootrom has security or functional issues.
...
```
bootrom i_bootrom_patch (
.clk_i ,
.req_i ( rom_req ),
.addr_i ( rom_addr ),
.rdata_o ( rom_rdata_patch )
);
bootrom_linux i_bootrom_linux (
.clk_i ,
.req_i ( rom_req ),
.addr_i ( rom_addr ),
.rdata_o ( rom_rdata_linux )
);
```
assign rom_rdata = (ariane_boot_sel_i) ? rom_rdata_linux : rom_rdata_linux;**
... Ejemplo de código seguro
Secure Verilog
The above implementation causes the ROM data to be hardcoded for the linux system (rom_rdata_linux) regardless of the value of ariane_boot_sel_i. Therefore, the data (rom_rdata_patch) from the patchable ROM code is never used [REF-1396]. This weakness disables the ROM's ability to be patched. If attackers uncover security vulnerabilities in the ROM, the users must replace the entire device. Otherwise, the weakness exposes the system to a vulnerable state forever. A fix to this issue is to enable rom_rdata to be selected from the patchable rom (rom_rdata_patch) [REF-1397].
...
```
bootrom i_bootrom_patch (
.clk_i ,
.req_i ( rom_req ),
.addr_i ( rom_addr ),
.rdata_o ( rom_rdata_patch )
);
bootrom_linux i_bootrom_linux (
.clk_i ,
.req_i ( rom_req ),
.addr_i ( rom_addr ),
.rdata_o ( rom_rdata_linux )
);
```
assign rom_rdata = (ariane_boot_sel_i) ? rom_rdata_patch : rom_rdata_linux;**
... What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Lista de prevención
How to prevent CWE-1310
- Architecture and Design / Implementation Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot.
- Architecture and Design / Implementation Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.
Señales de detección
How to detect CWE-1310
Ejecuta pruebas dinámicas de seguridad de aplicaciones (DAST) contra el endpoint en vivo.
Vigila los logs en tiempo de ejecución para detectar trazas de excepción inusuales, entradas malformadas o intentos de bypass de autorización.
Revisión de código: marca cualquier código nuevo que maneje entrada desde esta superficie sin usar los helpers validados del framework.
CWE-1310
Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.
Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.
Preguntas frecuentes ¿Qué es CWE-1310?
¿Qué gravedad tiene CWE-1310?
¿Qué lenguajes o plataformas se ven afectados por CWE-1310?
¿Cómo puedo prevenir CWE-1310?
¿Cómo detecta y corrige Plexicus CWE-1310?
¿Dónde puedo aprender más sobre CWE-1310?
Frequently asked questions
¿Qué es CWE-1310?
A system or System-on-Chip (SoC) lacks a mechanism to update its initial boot code stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM), permanently exposing devices to unfixable security vulnerabilities.
¿Qué gravedad tiene CWE-1310?
MITRE no ha publicado una calificación de probabilidad de explotación para esta debilidad. Trátala como de impacto medio hasta que tu modelo de amenazas demuestre lo contrario.
¿Qué lenguajes o plataformas se ven afectados por CWE-1310?
MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, System on Chip.
¿Cómo puedo prevenir CWE-1310?
Secure patch support to allow ROM code to be patched on the next boot. Support patches that can be programmed in-field or during manufacturing through hardware fuses. This feature can be used for limited patching of devices after shipping, or for the next batch of silicon devices manufactured, without changing the full device ROM.
¿Cómo detecta y corrige Plexicus CWE-1310?
El motor SAST de Plexicus detecta la firma de flujo de datos para CWE-1310 en cada commit. Cuando hay coincidencia, nuestro agente Codex Remedium abre un PR de corrección con el código corregido, las pruebas y un resumen de una línea para el revisor.
¿Dónde puedo aprender más sobre CWE-1310?
MITRE publica la definición canónica en https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1310.html. También puedes consultar la documentación de OWASP y NIST para guías relacionadas.
Debilidades relacionadas
Weaknesses related to CWE-1310
CWE-1329 Padre
Reliance on Component That is Not Updateable
This vulnerability occurs when a product depends on a component that cannot be updated or patched to fix security flaws or critical bugs.
CWE-1277 Hermano
Firmware Not Updateable
This vulnerability occurs when a hardware product lacks a mechanism for users to install firmware updates, leaving known security flaws…
Recursos
Further reading
- MITRE — CWE-1310 oficial https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1310.html
- riscv_peripherals.sv line 534 https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/75e5c0700b5a02e744f006fe8a09ff3c2ccdd32d/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/openpiton/riscv_peripherals.sv#L534
- Fix for riscv_peripherals.sv line 534 https://github.com/HACK-EVENT/hackatdac21/blob/cwe_1310_riscv_peripheral/piton/design/chip/tile/ariane/openpiton/riscv_peripherals.sv#L534
¿Listo para validar lo que importa?
Listo para validar lo que importa.
Plexicus es Proof-Driven AppSec: hallazgos validados, comprensión contextual y remediación revisada — anclada en evidencia, acotada contigo.