Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion')
This vulnerability occurs when an XML parser allows Document Type Definitions (DTDs) to contain recursively defined entities without proper limits, enabling malicious data structures.
What is CWE-776?
Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-776
-
XEE in XML-parsing library.
-
XML bomb / XEE in enterprise communication product.
-
"Billion laughs" attack in XMPP server daemon.
-
XML bomb in web server module
-
Parsing library allows XML bomb
Parcours de l'attaquant étape par étape
- 1
Identifier un chemin de code qui traite des entrées non fiables sans validation.
- 2
Élaborer une charge utile qui exploite le comportement non sécurisé — injection, traversal, débordement ou abus de logique.
- 3
Délivrer la charge utile via une requête normale et observer la réaction de l'application.
- 4
Itérer jusqu'à ce que la réponse divulgue des données, exécute le code de l'attaquant ou élève les privilèges.
Vulnerable XML
The DTD and the very brief XML below illustrate what is meant by an XML bomb. The ZERO entity contains one character, the letter A. The choice of entity name ZERO is being used to indicate length equivalent to that exponent on two, that is, the length of ZERO is 2^0. Similarly, ONE refers to ZERO twice, therefore the XML parser will expand ONE to a length of 2, or 2^1. Ultimately, we reach entity THIRTYTWO, which will expand to 2^32 characters in length, or 4 GB, probably consuming far more data than expected.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE MaliciousDTD [
<!ENTITY ZERO "A">
<!ENTITY ONE "&ZERO;&ZERO;">
<!ENTITY TWO "&ONE;&ONE;">
...
<!ENTITY THIRTYTWO "&THIRTYONE;&THIRTYONE;">
]>
<data>&THIRTYTWO;</data> The DTD and the very brief XML below illustrate what is meant by an XML bomb. The ZERO entity contains one character, the letter A. The choice of entity name ZERO is being used to indicate length equivalent to that exponent on two, that is, the length of ZERO is 2^0. Similarly, ONE refers to ZERO twice, therefore the XML parser will expand ONE to a length of 2, or 2^1. Ultimately, we reach entity THIRTYTWO, which will expand to 2^32 characters in length, or 4 GB, probably consuming far more data than expected.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE MaliciousDTD [
<!ENTITY ZERO "A">
<!ENTITY ONE "&ZERO;&ZERO;">
<!ENTITY TWO "&ONE;&ONE;">
...
<!ENTITY THIRTYTWO "&THIRTYONE;&THIRTYONE;">
]>
<data>&THIRTYTWO;</data> Secure pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
return executeWithGuards(safe);
} How to prevent CWE-776
- Operation If possible, prohibit the use of DTDs or use an XML parser that limits the expansion of recursive DTD entities.
- Implementation Before parsing XML files with associated DTDs, scan for recursive entity declarations and do not continue parsing potentially explosive content.
How to detect CWE-776
Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.
Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.
Frequently asked questions
Qu'est-ce que CWE-776 ?
This vulnerability occurs when an XML parser allows Document Type Definitions (DTDs) to contain recursively defined entities without proper limits, enabling malicious data structures.
Quelle est la gravité de CWE-776 ?
MITRE évalue la probabilité d'exploitation comme Moyenne — l'exploitation est réaliste mais nécessite généralement des conditions spécifiques.
Quels langages ou plateformes sont affectés par CWE-776 ?
MITRE lists the following affected platforms: XML.
Comment puis-je prévenir CWE-776 ?
If possible, prohibit the use of DTDs or use an XML parser that limits the expansion of recursive DTD entities. Before parsing XML files with associated DTDs, scan for recursive entity declarations and do not continue parsing potentially explosive content.
Comment Plexicus détecte et corrige CWE-776 ?
Le moteur SAST de Plexicus reconnaît la signature de flux de données de CWE-776 à chaque commit. Lorsqu'une correspondance est trouvée, notre agent Codex Remedium ouvre une PR de correction avec le code corrigé, les tests et un résumé d'une ligne pour le relecteur.
Où puis-je en savoir plus sur CWE-776 ?
MITRE publie la définition canonique à https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/776.html. Vous pouvez également consulter la documentation OWASP et NIST pour des conseils adjacents.
Weaknesses related to CWE-776
Further reading
- MITRE — CWE-776 officiel https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/776.html
- Multiple vendors XML parser (and SOAP/WebServices server) Denial of Service attack using DTD https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2002/Dec/229
- XML security: Preventing XML bombs http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/expert/KnowledgebaseAnswer/0,289625,sid92_gci1168442,00.html?asrc=SS_CLA_302%20%20558&psrc=CLT_92#
- Dismantling an XML-Bomb https://blog.didierstevens.com/2008/09/23/dismantling-an-xml-bomb/
- XML Entity Expansion http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13247002/XML%20Entity%20Expansion
- Tip: Configure SAX parsers for secure processing https://web.archive.org/web/20101005080451/http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/xml/library/x-tipcfsx.html
- XML Denial of Service Attacks and Defenses https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/msdn-magazine/2009/november/xml-denial-of-service-attacks-and-defenses
Prêt à valider ce qui compte.
Plexicus est Proof-Driven AppSec : findings validés, compréhension contextuelle et remédiation relue — ancrée dans la preuve, scopée avec vous.