CWE-607 Variante Brouillon

Public Static Final Field References Mutable Object

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not,…

Définition

What is CWE-607?

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not, malicious code or even accidental code in other packages can modify the object's contents, violating the intended immutability.
The core issue is a misunderstanding of the `final` keyword in Java and similar languages. When applied to an object reference, `final` only guarantees that the reference itself cannot be reassigned to point to a different object. It does not protect the internal state of the object that the reference points to. If that object is mutable—like an array, a collection, or a custom class with public setters—its data can be freely altered, even through the `static final` field. To prevent this, developers must ensure true immutability. This involves either assigning the static final field to an inherently immutable object (like a `String` or a boxed primitive) or defensively wrapping mutable objects. For collections, use `Collections.unmodifiableList()`, `Map.copyOf()`, or similar methods to create an unmodifiable view or a deep copy before assignment. This practice encapsulates the mutable data and enforces the read-only intent of the public static field.
Impact réel

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-607

Aucune référence CVE publique n'est liée à ce CWE dans le catalogue MITRE pour le moment.

Comment les attaquants l'exploitent

Parcours de l'attaquant étape par étape

  1. 1

    Identifier un chemin de code qui traite des entrées non fiables sans validation.

  2. 2

    Élaborer une charge utile qui exploite le comportement non sécurisé — injection, traversal, débordement ou abus de logique.

  3. 3

    Délivrer la charge utile via une requête normale et observer la réaction de l'application.

  4. 4

    Itérer jusqu'à ce que la réponse divulgue des données, exécute le code de l'attaquant ou élève les privilèges.

Exemple de code vulnérable

Vulnerable Java

Here, an array (which is inherently mutable) is labeled public static final.

Vulnérable Java
public static final String[] USER_ROLES;
Exemple de code sécurisé

Secure pseudo

Sécurisé pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Liste de contrôle de prévention

How to prevent CWE-607

  • Implementation Protect mutable objects by making them private. Restrict access to the getter and setter as well.
Signaux de détection

How to detect CWE-607

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-607

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Questions fréquentes

Frequently asked questions

Qu'est-ce que CWE-607 ?

This vulnerability occurs when a class exposes a public or protected static final field that points to a changeable object. Because the field's reference is constant but the object itself is not, malicious code or even accidental code in other packages can modify the object's contents, violating the intended immutability.

Quelle est la gravité de CWE-607 ?

MITRE n'a pas publié de note de probabilité d'exploitation pour cette faiblesse. Traitez-la comme un impact moyen jusqu'à ce que votre modèle de menace prouve le contraire.

Quels langages ou plateformes sont affectés par CWE-607 ?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Java.

Comment puis-je prévenir CWE-607 ?

Protect mutable objects by making them private. Restrict access to the getter and setter as well.

Comment Plexicus détecte et corrige CWE-607 ?

Le moteur SAST de Plexicus reconnaît la signature de flux de données de CWE-607 à chaque commit. Lorsqu'une correspondance est trouvée, notre agent Codex Remedium ouvre une PR de correction avec le code corrigé, les tests et un résumé d'une ligne pour le relecteur.

Où puis-je en savoir plus sur CWE-607 ?

MITRE publie la définition canonique à https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/607.html. Vous pouvez également consulter la documentation OWASP et NIST pour des conseils adjacents.

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Prêt à valider ce qui compte.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorized target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
  • Executive briefing
  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)
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