CWE-350 Variante Brouillon

Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses a reverse DNS lookup on an IP address to get a hostname and then uses that hostname for a security decision—like access control or logging—without…

Définition

What is CWE-350?

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses a reverse DNS lookup on an IP address to get a hostname and then uses that hostname for a security decision—like access control or logging—without verifying that the IP address actually belongs to that hostname.
Relying on a reverse DNS (rDNS) hostname for authentication or security decisions is inherently risky because DNS records are not a secure proof of identity. An attacker who controls the DNS server for their IP address can make it return any hostname they choose, such as 'trusted-server.internal,' potentially bypassing IP allowlists, spoofing logs, or gaining unauthorized access. Attackers can spoof these names either by compromising a legitimate DNS server (via methods like cache poisoning) or by legitimately managing the DNS for their own infrastructure. Since applications cannot easily distinguish between a legitimate rDNS response and a spoofed one, using this data for security-critical actions creates a significant weakness that can be exploited to hide malicious activity or impersonate trusted systems.
Impact réel

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-350

  • Does not do double-reverse lookup to prevent DNS spoofing.

  • Does not verify reverse-resolved hostnames in DNS.

  • Authentication bypass using spoofed reverse-resolved DNS hostnames.

  • Authentication bypass using spoofed reverse-resolved DNS hostnames.

  • Filter does not properly check the result of a reverse DNS lookup, which could allow remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via DNS spoofing.

  • Reverse DNS lookup used to spoof trusted content in intermediary.

  • Product records the reverse DNS name of a visitor in the logs, allowing spoofing and resultant XSS.

Comment les attaquants l'exploitent

Parcours de l'attaquant étape par étape

  1. 1

    The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status.

  2. 2

    IP addresses are more reliable than DNS names, but they can also be spoofed. Attackers can easily forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.

  3. 3

    In these examples, a connection is established if a request is made by a trusted host.

  4. 4

    These examples check if a request is from a trusted host before responding to a request, but the code only verifies the hostname as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof the hostname, thus impersonating a trusted client.

Exemple de code vulnérable

Vulnerable C

The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status.

Vulnérable C
struct hostent *hp;struct in_addr myaddr;
  char* tHost = "trustme.example.com";
  myaddr.s_addr=inet_addr(ip_addr_string);
  hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &myaddr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
  if (hp && !strncmp(hp->h_name, tHost, sizeof(tHost))) {
  	trusted = true;
  } else {
  	trusted = false;
  }
Exemple de code sécurisé

Secure pseudo

Sécurisé pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Liste de contrôle de prévention

How to prevent CWE-350

  • Architecture and Design Use other means of identity verification that cannot be simply spoofed. Possibilities include a username/password or certificate.
  • Implementation Perform proper forward and reverse DNS lookups to detect DNS spoofing.
Signaux de détection

How to detect CWE-350

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-350

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Questions fréquentes

Frequently asked questions

Qu'est-ce que CWE-350 ?

This vulnerability occurs when an application uses a reverse DNS lookup on an IP address to get a hostname and then uses that hostname for a security decision—like access control or logging—without verifying that the IP address actually belongs to that hostname.

Quelle est la gravité de CWE-350 ?

MITRE n'a pas publié de note de probabilité d'exploitation pour cette faiblesse. Traitez-la comme un impact moyen jusqu'à ce que votre modèle de menace prouve le contraire.

Quels langages ou plateformes sont affectés par CWE-350 ?

MITRE n'a pas spécifié les plateformes affectées pour ce CWE — il peut s'appliquer à la plupart des stacks applicatives.

Comment puis-je prévenir CWE-350 ?

Use other means of identity verification that cannot be simply spoofed. Possibilities include a username/password or certificate. Perform proper forward and reverse DNS lookups to detect DNS spoofing.

Comment Plexicus détecte et corrige CWE-350 ?

Le moteur SAST de Plexicus reconnaît la signature de flux de données de CWE-350 à chaque commit. Lorsqu'une correspondance est trouvée, notre agent Codex Remedium ouvre une PR de correction avec le code corrigé, les tests et un résumé d'une ligne pour le relecteur.

Où puis-je en savoir plus sur CWE-350 ?

MITRE publie la définition canonique à https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/350.html. Vous pouvez également consulter la documentation OWASP et NIST pour des conseils adjacents.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

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VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorized target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
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