CWE-321 Variante Brouillon High likelihood

Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key

This vulnerability occurs when an application embeds a fixed, unchangeable cryptographic key directly within its source code or configuration files.

Définition

What is CWE-321?

This vulnerability occurs when an application embeds a fixed, unchangeable cryptographic key directly within its source code or configuration files.
Hard-coding cryptographic keys is a common but dangerous practice that undermines the security of encrypted data. Since the key is the same in every instance of the application and cannot be changed without modifying the code, an attacker who discovers the key (e.g., by inspecting the source code, binaries, or configuration files) can decrypt any sensitive data the application protects. This flaw effectively renders encryption useless, as the secret is no longer secret. To fix this, developers should use secure key management systems that allow keys to be stored externally, rotated regularly, and accessed securely at runtime. While SAST tools can detect the hard-coded pattern, Plexicus uses AI to suggest the actual code fix—such as integrating with a secrets manager or environment variables—saving hours of manual refactoring and helping you enforce secure key handling across your entire application portfolio.
Vulnerability Diagram CWE-321
Hard-coded Cryptographic Key crypto.go var aesKey = []byte( "0123456789abcdef") cipher.Encrypt(aesKey, …) // same key on every install Attacker strings binary | grep hex → 0123456789abcdef decrypt all encrypted data, forge tokens, sign things A literal AES/HMAC key in code = one extracted key compromises every customer.
Impact réel

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-321

  • Engineering Workstation uses hard-coded cryptographic keys that could allow for unathorized filesystem access and privilege escalation

  • Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) uses a hard-coded SSH private key that is likely to be used by default.

  • WiFi router service has a hard-coded encryption key, allowing root access

  • Communications / collaboration product has a hardcoded SSH private key, allowing access to root account

Comment les attaquants l'exploitent

Parcours de l'attaquant étape par étape

  1. 1

    The following code examples attempt to verify a password using a hard-coded cryptographic key.

  2. 2

    The cryptographic key is within a hard-coded string value that is compared to the password. It is likely that an attacker will be able to read the key and compromise the system.

  3. 3

    In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.

  4. 4

    Multiple vendors used hard-coded keys for critical functionality in their OT products.

Exemple de code vulnérable

Vulnerable C

The following code examples attempt to verify a password using a hard-coded cryptographic key.

Vulnérable C
int VerifyAdmin(char *password) {
  		if (strcmp(password,"68af404b513073584c4b6f22b6c63e6b")) {
  				printf("Incorrect Password!\n");
  				return(0);
  		}
  		printf("Entering Diagnostic Mode...\n");
  		return(1);
  }
Exemple de code sécurisé

Secure pseudo

Sécurisé pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Liste de contrôle de prévention

How to prevent CWE-321

  • Architecture and Design Prevention schemes mirror that of hard-coded password storage.
Signaux de détection

How to detect CWE-321

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

CWE-321

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Questions fréquentes

Frequently asked questions

Qu'est-ce que CWE-321 ?

This vulnerability occurs when an application embeds a fixed, unchangeable cryptographic key directly within its source code or configuration files.

Quelle est la gravité de CWE-321 ?

MITRE évalue la probabilité d'exploitation comme Élevée — cette faiblesse est activement exploitée et doit être priorisée pour la remédiation.

Quels langages ou plateformes sont affectés par CWE-321 ?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: ICS/OT.

Comment puis-je prévenir CWE-321 ?

Prevention schemes mirror that of hard-coded password storage.

Comment Plexicus détecte et corrige CWE-321 ?

Le moteur SAST de Plexicus reconnaît la signature de flux de données de CWE-321 à chaque commit. Lorsqu'une correspondance est trouvée, notre agent Codex Remedium ouvre une PR de correction avec le code corrigé, les tests et un résumé d'une ligne pour le relecteur.

Où puis-je en savoir plus sur CWE-321 ?

MITRE publie la définition canonique à https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/321.html. Vous pouvez également consulter la documentation OWASP et NIST pour des conseils adjacents.

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Prêt à valider ce qui compte.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorized target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
Every engagement hands over:
  • Executive briefing
  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)
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