CWE-297 Variante Incomplet High likelihood

Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch

This vulnerability occurs when an application accepts a valid SSL/TLS certificate without properly verifying that it actually belongs to the specific host it's connecting to. Even a correctly signed…

Définition

What is CWE-297?

This vulnerability occurs when an application accepts a valid SSL/TLS certificate without properly verifying that it actually belongs to the specific host it's connecting to. Even a correctly signed certificate from a trusted authority can be misused if the hostname check is missing or flawed.
When your application connects to a server, it must verify that the certificate presented matches the intended hostname. This is done by checking the Common Name (CN) or, more reliably, the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) fields in the certificate. If this validation is skipped or implemented incorrectly, an attacker with a valid certificate for a different domain can impersonate your trusted service, leading to man-in-the-middle attacks and data interception. Common validation pitfalls include incomplete string comparisons that can be tricked by special characters, or failing to perform hostname checks when using certificate pinning. Always validate the hostname at the time of pinning and use established library functions for hostname verification instead of custom string matching, as these functions correctly handle edge cases like null bytes and wildcards.
Impact réel

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-297

  • Mobile banking application does not verify hostname, leading to financial loss.

  • Mobile application for printing documents does not verify hostname, allowing attackers to read sensitive documents.

  • Software for electronic checking does not verify hostname, leading to financial loss.

  • Cloud-support library written in Python uses incorrect regular expression when matching hostname.

  • Web browser does not correctly handle '\0' character (NUL) in Common Name, allowing spoofing of https sites.

  • Database program truncates the Common Name during hostname verification, allowing spoofing.

  • Incorrect handling of '\0' character (NUL) in hostname verification allows spoofing.

  • Mail server's incorrect handling of '\0' character (NUL) in hostname verification allows spoofing.

Comment les attaquants l'exploitent

Parcours de l'attaquant étape par étape

  1. 1

    Identifier un chemin de code qui traite des entrées non fiables sans validation.

  2. 2

    Élaborer une charge utile qui exploite le comportement non sécurisé — injection, traversal, débordement ou abus de logique.

  3. 3

    Délivrer la charge utile via une requête normale et observer la réaction de l'application.

  4. 4

    Itérer jusqu'à ce que la réponse divulgue des données, exécute le code de l'attaquant ou élève les privilèges.

Exemple de code vulnérable

Vulnerable C

The following OpenSSL code obtains a certificate and verifies it.

Vulnérable C
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
  if (cert && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl)==X509_V_OK)) {
```
// do secret things* 
  		}
Exemple de code sécurisé

Secure pseudo

Sécurisé pseudo
// Validate, sanitize, or use a safe API before reaching the sink.
function handleRequest(input) {
  const safe = validateAndEscape(input);
  return executeWithGuards(safe);
}
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Liste de contrôle de prévention

How to prevent CWE-297

  • Architecture and Design Fully check the hostname of the certificate and provide the user with adequate information about the nature of the problem and how to proceed.
  • Implementation If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.
Signaux de détection

How to detect CWE-297

Automated Static Analysis High

Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

Set up an untrusted endpoint (e.g. a server) with which the product will connect. Create a test certificate that uses an invalid hostname but is signed by a trusted CA and provide this certificate from the untrusted endpoint. If the product performs any operations instead of disconnecting and reporting an error, then this indicates that the hostname is not being checked and the test certificate has been accepted.

Black Box

When Certificate Pinning is being used in a mobile application, consider using a tool such as Spinner [REF-955]. This methodology might be extensible to other technologies.

CWE-297

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Questions fréquentes

Frequently asked questions

Qu'est-ce que CWE-297 ?

This vulnerability occurs when an application accepts a valid SSL/TLS certificate without properly verifying that it actually belongs to the specific host it's connecting to. Even a correctly signed certificate from a trusted authority can be misused if the hostname check is missing or flawed.

Quelle est la gravité de CWE-297 ?

MITRE évalue la probabilité d'exploitation comme Élevée — cette faiblesse est activement exploitée et doit être priorisée pour la remédiation.

Quels langages ou plateformes sont affectés par CWE-297 ?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Mobile, Not Technology-Specific.

Comment puis-je prévenir CWE-297 ?

Fully check the hostname of the certificate and provide the user with adequate information about the nature of the problem and how to proceed. If certificate pinning is being used, ensure that all relevant properties of the certificate are fully validated before the certificate is pinned, including the hostname.

Comment Plexicus détecte et corrige CWE-297 ?

Le moteur SAST de Plexicus reconnaît la signature de flux de données de CWE-297 à chaque commit. Lorsqu'une correspondance est trouvée, notre agent Codex Remedium ouvre une PR de correction avec le code corrigé, les tests et un résumé d'une ligne pour le relecteur.

Où puis-je en savoir plus sur CWE-297 ?

MITRE publie la définition canonique à https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/297.html. Vous pouvez également consulter la documentation OWASP et NIST pour des conseils adjacents.

Faiblesses associées

Weaknesses related to CWE-297

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CWE-419 Frère

Unprotected Primary Channel

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Unprotected Alternate Channel

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CWE-940 Frère

Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel

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CWE-941 Frère

Incorrectly Specified Destination in a Communication Channel

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

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VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorized target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
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