CWE-1302 Base Incomplet

Missing Source Identifier in Entity Transactions on a System-On-Chip (SOC)

This vulnerability occurs when a System-On-Chip (SoC) component sends a transaction without its required security identifier. The destination hardware cannot properly verify permissions, leading to…

Définition

What is CWE-1302?

This vulnerability occurs when a System-On-Chip (SoC) component sends a transaction without its required security identifier. The destination hardware cannot properly verify permissions, leading to unintended access or system failure.
In a System-On-Chip, hardware agents like processors or accelerators constantly send transactions to access resources or trigger actions. Each transaction should carry a security identifier (like a digital keycard) that tells the receiving agent the sender's privilege level. Without this identifier, the receiving agent has no way to correctly enforce security policies for that specific request. This missing identifier forces the destination into a guesswork scenario. It may either reject the transaction entirely—causing a functional denial-of-service—or default to allowing it, which can lead to privilege escalation or unauthorized access to protected assets. The core issue is inconsistent tagging of transactions at their source, undermining the chip's entire internal security model.
Impact réel

Real-world CVEs caused by CWE-1302

Aucune référence CVE publique n'est liée à ce CWE dans le catalogue MITRE pour le moment.

Comment les attaquants l'exploitent

Parcours de l'attaquant étape par étape

  1. 1

    Consider a system with a register for storing AES key for encryption or decryption. The key is of 128 bits implemented as a set of four 32-bit registers. The key registers are assets, and the register AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY is defined to provide the necessary access controls. The access-policy register defines which agents with a security identifier in the transaction can access the AES-key registers. Each bit in this 32-bit register defines a security identifier. There could be a maximum of 32 security identifiers that are allowed accesses to the AES-key registers. The number of the bit when set (i.e., "1") allows for a respective action from an agent whose identity matches the number of the bit; if set to "0" (i.e., Clear), it disallows the respective action to that corresponding agent.

  2. 2

    The originator sends a transaction with no security identifier, i.e., meaning the value is "0" or NULL. The AES-Key-access register does not allow the necessary action and drops the transaction because the originator failed to include the required security identifier.

  3. 3

    The originator should send a transaction with Security Identifier "2" which will allow access to the AES-Key-access register and allow encryption and decryption operations.

Exemple de code vulnérable

Vulnerable code

Consider a system with a register for storing AES key for encryption or decryption. The key is of 128 bits implemented as a set of four 32-bit registers. The key registers are assets, and the register AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY is defined to provide the necessary access controls. The access-policy register defines which agents with a security identifier in the transaction can access the AES-key registers. Each bit in this 32-bit register defines a security identifier. There could be a maximum of 32 security identifiers that are allowed accesses to the AES-key registers. The number of the bit when set (i.e., "1") allows for a respective action from an agent whose identity matches the number of the bit; if set to "0" (i.e., Clear), it disallows the respective action to that corresponding agent.

Vulnérable
| Register | Field description | 
| --- | --- |
| AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 | AES key [0:31] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000  |
| AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_1 | AES key [32:63] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000  |
| AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_2 | AES key [64:95] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000  |
| AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_4 | AES key [96:127] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000  |
| AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY | [31:0] Default 0x00000004 - agent with Security Identifier "2" has access to AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 through AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_4 registers  |
Exemple de code sécurisé

Secure code

The originator sends a transaction with no security identifier, i.e., meaning the value is "0" or NULL. The AES-Key-access register does not allow the necessary action and drops the transaction because the originator failed to include the required security identifier.

Sécurisé
| Register | Field description | 
| --- | --- |
| AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 | AES key [0:31] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000  |
| AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_1 | AES key [32:63] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000  |
| AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_2 | AES key [64:95] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000  |
| AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_4 | AES key [96:127] for encryption or decryption, Default 0x00000000  |
| AES_KEY_ACCESS_POLICY | [31:0] Default 0x00000002 - agent with security identifier "2" has access to AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_0 through AES_ENC_DEC_KEY_4 registers  |
What changed: the unsafe sink is replaced (or the input is validated/escaped) so the same payload no longer triggers the weakness.
Liste de contrôle de prévention

How to prevent CWE-1302

  • Architecture and Design Transaction details must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses.
  • Implementation Security identifier definition and programming flow must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.
Signaux de détection

How to detect CWE-1302

SAST High

Exécuter une analyse statique (SAST) sur le code source à la recherche du motif non sécurisé dans le flux de données.

DAST Moderate

Exécuter des tests de sécurité applicative dynamique (DAST) contre le point de terminaison en ligne.

Runtime Moderate

Surveiller les journaux runtime pour détecter des traces d'exception inhabituelles, des entrées malformées ou des tentatives de contournement d'autorisation.

Code review Moderate

Revue de code : signaler tout nouveau code qui traite les entrées de cette surface sans utiliser les helpers du framework validés.

CWE-1302

Don't catalog this weakness. Prove it's reachable.

Plexicus turns CWE catalogs into evidence: every CWE-pattern is matched against your real code graph, reach is proven on a sandbox clone, and verified findings ship as reviewed PRs.

Questions fréquentes

Frequently asked questions

Qu'est-ce que CWE-1302 ?

This vulnerability occurs when a System-On-Chip (SoC) component sends a transaction without its required security identifier. The destination hardware cannot properly verify permissions, leading to unintended access or system failure.

Quelle est la gravité de CWE-1302 ?

MITRE n'a pas publié de note de probabilité d'exploitation pour cette faiblesse. Traitez-la comme un impact moyen jusqu'à ce que votre modèle de menace prouve le contraire.

Quels langages ou plateformes sont affectés par CWE-1302 ?

MITRE lists the following affected platforms: Not OS-Specific, Not Architecture-Specific, Not Technology-Specific.

Comment puis-je prévenir CWE-1302 ?

Transaction details must be reviewed for design inconsistency and common weaknesses. Security identifier definition and programming flow must be tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.

Comment Plexicus détecte et corrige CWE-1302 ?

Le moteur SAST de Plexicus reconnaît la signature de flux de données de CWE-1302 à chaque commit. Lorsqu'une correspondance est trouvée, notre agent Codex Remedium ouvre une PR de correction avec le code corrigé, les tests et un résumé d'une ligne pour le relecteur.

Où puis-je en savoir plus sur CWE-1302 ?

MITRE publie la définition canonique à https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1302.html. Vous pouvez également consulter la documentation OWASP et NIST pour des conseils adjacents.

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Prêt à valider ce qui compte.

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SAMPLE HANDOVER · ILLUSTRATIVE

Sample evidence handover

A trimmed view of what your team receives at the end of an AI Swarm Pentest engagement. Real engagements include full technical evidence, executive narrative, and a remediation plan.

VALIDATED FINDING Evidence attached

Server-Side Request Forgery in webhooks/receiver

demo-project/sample-app · src/webhooks/receiver.py:42

SeverityHigh CVSS 3.18.6 Priority79 Confirmedvia replay

Untrusted caller-supplied URLs reach an internal egress without an allowlist. Replayed in a sandbox against a fresh authorized target — the same control was validated to fail twice.

REVIEWER-READY REMEDIATION Merge-ready PR

Validate the target URL against an allowlist of permitted hostnames. Reject private/internal IP ranges. Enforce HTTPS only.

plexicus/remediation/webhooks-ssrf 3 changed · 0 new files
42resp = requests.get(target_url)
42+if not is_allowed_host(target_url):
43+  raise WebhookRejected(target_url)
44+resp = requests.get(target_url, timeout=5)
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  • Validated findings list
  • Merge-ready PRs
  • Compliance mapping (NIS2 · DORA · CRA)
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