Not Failing Securely ('Failing Open')

Draft Class
Structure: Simple
Description

When the product encounters an error condition or failure, its design requires it to fall back to a state that is less secure than other options that are available, such as selecting the weakest encryption algorithm or using the most permissive access control restrictions.

Extended Description

By entering a less secure state, the product inherits the weaknesses associated with that state, making it easier to compromise. At the least, it causes administrators to have a false sense of security. This weakness typically occurs as a result of wanting to "fail functional" to minimize administration and support costs, instead of "failing safe."

Common Consequences 1
Scope: Access Control

Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism

Intended access restrictions can be bypassed, which is often contradictory to what the product's administrator expects.

Potential Mitigations 1
Phase: Architecture and Design
Subdivide and allocate resources and components so that a failure in one part does not affect the entire product.
Demonstrative Examples 1

ID : DX-164

Switches may revert their functionality to that of hubs when the table used to map ARP information to the switch interface overflows, such as when under a spoofing attack. This results in traffic being broadcast to an eavesdropper, instead of being sent only on the relevant switch interface. To mitigate this type of problem, the developer could limit the number of ARP entries that can be recorded for a given switch interface, while other interfaces may keep functioning normally. Configuration options can be provided on the appropriate actions to be taken in case of a detected failure, but safe defaults should be used.
Observed Examples 2
CVE-2007-5277The failure of connection attempts in a web browser resets DNS pin restrictions. An attacker can then bypass the same origin policy by rebinding a domain name to a different IP address. This was an attempt to "fail functional."
CVE-2006-4407Incorrect prioritization leads to the selection of a weaker cipher. Although it is not known whether this issue occurred in implementation or design, it is feasible that a poorly designed algorithm could be a factor.
References 2
The Protection of Information in Computer Systems
Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder
Proceedings of the IEEE 63
09-1975
ID: REF-196
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
Not Technology-Specific : UndeterminedICS/OT : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Alternate Terms

Failing Open

Taxonomy Mapping
  • OWASP Top Ten 2004
Notes
Research GapSince design issues are hard to fix, they are rarely publicly reported, so there are few CVE examples of this problem as of January 2008. Most publicly reported issues occur as the result of an implementation error instead of design, such as CVE-2005-3177 (Improper handling of large numbers of resources) or CVE-2005-2969 (inadvertently disabling a verification step, leading to selection of a weaker protocol).