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Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)

Incomplete Class
Structure: Simple
Description

The product does not properly control situations in which an adversary can cause the product to consume or produce excessive resources without requiring the adversary to invest equivalent work or otherwise prove authorization, i.e., the adversary's influence is "asymmetric."

Extended Description

This can lead to poor performance due to "amplification" of resource consumption, typically in a non-linear fashion. This situation is worsened if the product allows malicious users or attackers to consume more resources than their access level permits.
Common Consequences 1
Scope: Availability

Impact: DoS: AmplificationDoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)

Sometimes this is a factor in "flood" attacks, but other types of amplification exist.
Potential Mitigations 3
Phase: Architecture and Design
An application must make resources available to a client commensurate with the client's access level.
Phase: Architecture and Design
An application must, at all times, keep track of allocated resources and meter their usage appropriately.
Phase: System Configuration
Consider disabling resource-intensive algorithms on the server side, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

Effectiveness: High
Demonstrative Examples 5

ID : DX-113

This code listens on a port for DNS requests and sends the result to the requesting address.

Code Example:

Bad
Python
python
This code sends a DNS record to a requesting IP address. UDP allows the source IP address to be easily changed ('spoofed'), thus allowing an attacker to redirect responses to a target, which may be then be overwhelmed by the network traffic.

ID : DX-157

This function prints the contents of a specified file requested by a user.

Code Example:

Bad
PHP
php

//read file into string* $file = file_get_contents($filename); if ($file && isOwnerOf($username,$filename)){ ``` echo $file; return true; } else{ echo 'You are not authorized to view this file'; } return false; }

This code first reads a specified file into memory, then prints the file if the user is authorized to see its contents. The read of the file into memory may be resource intensive and is unnecessary if the user is not allowed to see the file anyway.
ID : DX-53
The DTD and the very brief XML below illustrate what is meant by an XML bomb. The ZERO entity contains one character, the letter A. The choice of entity name ZERO is being used to indicate length equivalent to that exponent on two, that is, the length of ZERO is 2^0. Similarly, ONE refers to ZERO twice, therefore the XML parser will expand ONE to a length of 2, or 2^1. Ultimately, we reach entity THIRTYTWO, which will expand to 2^32 characters in length, or 4 GB, probably consuming far more data than expected.
Code Example:
Attack
XML
xml
ID : DX-158
This example attempts to check if an input string is a "sentence" [REF-1164].
Code Example:
Bad
JavaScript
var test_string = "Bad characters: $@#";
var bad_pattern = /^(\w+\s?)*$/i;
var result = test_string.search(bad_pattern);
The regular expression has a vulnerable backtracking clause inside (\w+\s?)*$ which can be triggered to cause a Denial of Service by processing particular phrases.


To fix the backtracking problem, backtracking is removed with the ?= portion of the expression which changes it to a lookahead and the \2 which prevents the backtracking. The modified example is:
Code Example:
Good
JavaScript
var test_string = "Bad characters: $@#";
var good_pattern = /^((?=(\w+))\2\s?)*$/i;
var result = test_string.search(good_pattern);
Note that [REF-1164] has a more thorough (and lengthy) explanation of everything going on within the RegEx.
An adversary can cause significant resource consumption on a server by filtering the cryptographic algorithms offered by the client to the ones that are the most resource-intensive on the server side. After discovering which cryptographic algorithms are supported by the server, a malicious client can send the initial cryptographic handshake messages that contains only the resource-intensive algorithms. For some cryptographic protocols, these messages can be completely prefabricated, as the resource-intensive part of the handshake happens on the server-side first (such as TLS), rather than on the client side. In the case of cryptographic protocols where the resource-intensive part should happen on the client-side first (such as SSH), a malicious client can send a forged/precalculated computation result, which seems correct to the server, so the resource-intensive part of the handshake is going to happen on the server side. A malicious client is required to send only the initial messages of a cryptographic handshake to initiate the resource-consuming part of the cryptographic handshake. These messages are usually small, and generating them requires minimal computational effort, enabling a denial-of-service attack. An additional risk is the fact that higher key size increases the effectiveness of the attack. Cryptographic protocols where the clients have influence over the size of the used key (such as TLS 1.3 or SSH) are most at risk, as the client can enforce the highest key size supported by the server.
  
Observed Examples 8
CVE-1999-0513Classic "Smurf" attack, using spoofed ICMP packets to broadcast addresses.
CVE-2003-1564Parsing library allows XML bomb
CVE-2004-2458Tool creates directories before authenticating user.
CVE-2020-10735Python has "quadratic complexity" issue when converting string to int with many digits in unexpected bases
CVE-2020-5243server allows ReDOS with crafted User-Agent strings, due to overlapping capture groups that cause excessive backtracking.
CVE-2013-5211composite: NTP feature generates large responses (high amplification factor) with spoofed UDP source addresses.
CVE-2002-20001Diffie-Hellman (DHE) Key Agreement Protocol allows attackers to send arbitrary numbers that are not public keys, which causes the server to perform expensive, unnecessary computation of modular exponentiation.
CVE-2022-40735The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol allows use of long exponents, which are more computationally expensive than using certain "short exponents" with particular properties.
  
References 1
Catastrophic backtracking
Ilya Kantor
13-12-2020
https://javascript.info/regexp-catastrophic-backtracking
ID: REF-1164
 
  
    
 
 
Applicable Platforms 
 
 
 
 
 
Languages:
 
 
 Not Language-Specific : Undetermined 
 
 
Technologies:
 
 
 Not Technology-Specific : UndeterminedClient Server : Undetermined 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Modes of Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
  Architecture and Design  
 
  Implementation  
 
  Operation  
 
 
 
          
 
 
Related Weaknesses 
 
 
 
 
  ChildOf:
 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400) 
 
 
 
 
Taxonomy Mapping 
  • PLOVER
  • OWASP Top Ten 2004
  • WASC
  • The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)
  • The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)