Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)

Draft Base
Structure: Simple
Description

The product uses a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) in a security context, but the PRNG's algorithm is not cryptographically strong.

Extended Description

When a non-cryptographic PRNG is used in a cryptographic context, it can expose the cryptography to certain types of attacks. Often a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is not designed for cryptography. Sometimes a mediocre source of randomness is sufficient or preferable for algorithms that use random numbers. Weak generators generally take less processing power and/or do not use the precious, finite, entropy sources on a system. While such PRNGs might have very useful features, these same features could be used to break the cryptography.

Common Consequences 1
Scope: Access Control

Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism

If a PRNG is used for authentication and authorization, such as a session ID or a seed for generating a cryptographic key, then an attacker may be able to easily guess the ID or cryptographic key and gain access to restricted functionality.

Detection Methods 1
Automated Static AnalysisHigh
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Potential Mitigations 1
Phase: Implementation
Use functions or hardware which use a hardware-based random number generation for all crypto. This is the recommended solution. Use CyptGenRandom on Windows, or hw_rand() on Linux.
Demonstrative Examples 1

ID : DX-102

Both of these examples use a statistical PRNG seeded with the current value of the system clock to generate a random number:

Code Example:

Bad
Java
java

Code Example:

Bad
C
c
The random number functions used in these examples, rand() and Random.nextInt(), are not considered cryptographically strong. An attacker may be able to predict the random numbers generated by these functions. Note that these example also exhibit Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) (Predictable Seed in PRNG).
Observed Examples 5
CVE-2021-3692PHP framework uses mt_rand() function (Marsenne Twister) when generating tokens
CVE-2009-3278Crypto product uses rand() library function to generate a recovery key, making it easier to conduct brute force attacks.
CVE-2009-3238Random number generator can repeatedly generate the same value.
CVE-2009-2367Web application generates predictable session IDs, allowing session hijacking.
CVE-2008-0166SSL library uses a weak random number generator that only generates 65,536 unique keys.
References 2
The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc.
2005
ID: REF-18
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, and John Viega
McGraw-Hill
2010
ID: REF-44
Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation
Taxonomy Mapping
  • CLASP
  • CERT C Secure Coding
Notes
MaintenanceAs of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.