Generation of Predictable IV with CBC Mode

Draft Variant
Structure: Simple
Description

The product generates and uses a predictable initialization Vector (IV) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, which causes algorithms to be susceptible to dictionary attacks when they are encrypted under the same key.

Extended Description

CBC mode eliminates a weakness of Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode by allowing identical plaintext blocks to be encrypted to different ciphertext blocks. This is possible by the XOR-ing of an IV with the initial plaintext block so that every plaintext block in the chain is XOR'd with a different value before encryption. If IVs are reused, then identical plaintexts would be encrypted to identical ciphertexts. However, even if IVs are not identical but are predictable, then they still break the security of CBC mode against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA).

Common Consequences 1
Scope: Confidentiality

Impact: Read Application Data

If the IV is not properly initialized, data that is encrypted can be compromised and leak information.

Detection Methods 1
Automated Static AnalysisHigh
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
Potential Mitigations 1
Phase: Implementation
NIST recommends two methods of generating unpredictable IVs for CBC mode [REF-1172]. The first is to generate the IV randomly. The second method is to encrypt a nonce with the same key and cipher to be used to encrypt the plaintext. In this case the nonce must be unique but can be predictable, since the block cipher will act as a pseudo random permutation.
Demonstrative Examples 1

ID : DX-143

In the following examples, CBC mode is used when encrypting data:

Code Example:

Bad
C
c

Code Example:

Bad
Java
java
In both of these examples, the initialization vector (IV) is always a block of zeros. This makes the resulting cipher text much more predictable and susceptible to a dictionary attack.
Observed Examples 5
CVE-2020-5408encryption functionality in an authentication framework uses a fixed null IV with CBC mode, allowing attackers to decrypt traffic in applications that use this functionality
CVE-2017-17704messages for a door-unlocking product use a fixed IV in CBC mode, which is the same after each restart
CVE-2017-11133application uses AES in CBC mode, but the pseudo-random secret and IV are generated using math.random, which is not cryptographically strong.
CVE-2007-3528Blowfish-CBC implementation constructs an IV where each byte is calculated modulo 8 instead of modulo 256, resulting in less than 12 bits for the effective IV length, and less than 4096 possible IV values.
CVE-2011-3389BEAST attack in SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0. In CBC mode, chained initialization vectors are non-random, allowing decryption of HTTPS traffic using a chosen plaintext attack.
References 4
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, and Justin Schuh
Addison Wesley
2006
ID: REF-62
The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc.
2005
ID: REF-18
Why IND-CPA implies randomized encryption
Matthew Green
24-08-2018
ID: REF-1171
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation
NIST
12-2001
ID: REF-1172
Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
ICS/OT : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Functional Areas
  1. Cryptography
Taxonomy Mapping
  • CLASP
Notes
MaintenanceAs of CWE 4.5, terminology related to randomness, entropy, and predictability can vary widely. Within the developer and other communities, "randomness" is used heavily. However, within cryptography, "entropy" is distinct, typically implied as a measurement. There are no commonly-used definitions, even within standards documents and cryptography papers. Future versions of CWE will attempt to define these terms and, if necessary, distinguish between them in ways that are appropriate for different communities but do not reduce the usability of CWE for mapping, understanding, or other scenarios.