Key Exchange without Entity Authentication

Draft Base
Structure: Simple
Description

The product performs a key exchange with an actor without verifying the identity of that actor.

Extended Description

Performing a key exchange will preserve the integrity of the information sent between two entities, but this will not guarantee that the entities are who they claim they are. This may enable an attacker to impersonate an actor by modifying traffic between the two entities. Typically, this involves a victim client that contacts a malicious server that is impersonating a trusted server. If the client skips authentication or ignores an authentication failure, the malicious server may request authentication information from the user. The malicious server can then use this authentication information to log in to the trusted server using the victim's credentials, sniff traffic between the victim and trusted server, etc.

Common Consequences 2
Scope: Access Control

Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism

No authentication takes place in this process, bypassing an assumed protection of encryption.

Scope: Confidentiality

Impact: Read Application Data

The encrypted communication between a user and a trusted host may be subject to sniffing by any actor in the communication path.

Potential Mitigations 2
Phase: Architecture and Design
Ensure that proper authentication is included in the system design.
Phase: Implementation
Understand and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the identity of entities involved in encrypted communications.
Demonstrative Examples 1
Many systems have used Diffie-Hellman key exchange without authenticating the entities exchanging keys, allowing attackers to influence communications by redirecting or interfering with the communication path. Many people using SSL/TLS skip the authentication (often unknowingly).
References 3
The CLASP Application Security Process
Secure Software, Inc.
2005
ID: REF-18
24 Deadly Sins of Software Security
Michael Howard, David LeBlanc, and John Viega
McGraw-Hill
2010
ID: REF-44
The Art of Software Security Assessment
Mark Dowd, John McDonald, and Justin Schuh
Addison Wesley
2006
ID: REF-62
Likelihood of Exploit

High

Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Taxonomy Mapping
  • CLASP