Least Privilege Violation

Incomplete Base

Structure: Simple

Description

The elevated privilege level required to perform operations such as chroot() should be dropped immediately after the operation is performed.

Common Consequences 1

Scope: Access ControlConfidentiality

Impact: Gain Privileges or Assume IdentityRead Application DataRead Files or Directories

An attacker may be able to access resources with the elevated privilege that could not be accessed with the attacker's original privileges. This is particularly likely in conjunction with another flaw, such as a buffer overflow.

Detection Methods 6

Automated Static Analysis - Binary or BytecodeSOAR Partial

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Compare binary / bytecode to application permission manifest

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results InterpretationSOAR Partial

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Host-based Vulnerability Scanners - Examine configuration for flaws, verifying that audit mechanisms work, ensure host configuration meets certain predefined criteria

Manual Static Analysis - Source CodeHigh

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Highly cost effective: ``` Manual Source Code Review (not inspections) ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source

Automated Static Analysis - Source CodeSOAR Partial

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Source code Weakness Analyzer Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Automated Static AnalysisSOAR Partial

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Permission Manifest Analysis

Architecture or Design ReviewHigh

According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Highly cost effective: ``` Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.) Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Attack Modeling

Potential Mitigations 3

Phase: Architecture and DesignOperation

Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.

Phase: Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

Demonstrative Examples 3

The following example demonstrates the weakness.

Code Example:

Bad

// Do some important stuff* setuid(old_uid);

ID : DX-142

The following example demonstrates the weakness.

Code Example:

Bad

Java

java

// privileged code goes here, for example:* System.loadLibrary("awt"); return null;

java

ID : DX-98

The following code calls chroot() to restrict the application to a subset of the filesystem below APP_HOME in order to prevent an attacker from using the program to gain unauthorized access to files located elsewhere. The code then opens a file specified by the user and processes the contents of the file.

Code Example:Bad
C
c

Constraining the process inside the application's home directory before opening any files is a valuable security measure. However, the absence of a call to setuid() with some non-zero value means the application is continuing to operate with unnecessary root privileges. Any successful exploit carried out by an attacker against the application can now result in a privilege escalation attack because any malicious operations will be performed with the privileges of the superuser. If the application drops to the privilege level of a non-root user, the potential for damage is substantially reduced.

References 2

Seven Pernicious Kingdoms: A Taxonomy of Software Security Errors

Katrina Tsipenyuk, Brian Chess, and Gary McGraw

NIST Workshop on Software Security Assurance Tools Techniques and Metrics • NIST

07-11-2005

https://samate.nist.gov/SSATTM_Content/papers/Seven%20Pernicious%20Kingdoms%20-%20Taxonomy%20of%20Sw%20Security%20Errors%20-%20Tsipenyuk%20-%20Chess%20-%20McGraw.pdf

ID: REF-6

State-of-the-Art Resources (SOAR) for Software Vulnerability Detection, Test, and Evaluation

Gregory Larsen, E. Kenneth Hong Fong, David A. Wheeler, and Rama S. Moorthy

07-2014

https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/s/st/stateoftheart-resources-soar-for-software-vulnerability-detection-test-and-evaluation/p-5061.ashx(2025-09-05)

ID: REF-1479

Applicable Platforms

Languages:

Not Language-Specific : Undetermined

Modes of Introduction

Implementation

Operation

Related Attack Patterns

Related Weaknesses

ChildOf:

Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors (CWE-271)

Taxonomy Mapping

7 Pernicious Kingdoms
CLASP
CERT C Secure Coding
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011)
Software Fault Patterns

Notes

MaintenancePrivilege Dropping / Lowering Errors, Least Privilege Violation, and Execution with Unnecessary Privileges are all closely related and possibly overlapping. Privilege Dropping / Lowering Errors is probably better suited as a category.

Other If system privileges are not dropped when it is reasonable to do so, this is not a vulnerability by itself. According to the principle of least privilege, access should be allowed only when it is absolutely necessary to the function of a given system, and only for the minimal necessary amount of time. Any further allowance of privilege widens the window of time during which a successful exploitation of the system will provide an attacker with that same privilege. If at all possible, limit the allowance of system privilege to small, simple sections of code that may be called atomically. When a program calls a privileged function, such as chroot(), it must first acquire root privilege. As soon as the privileged operation has completed, the program should drop root privilege and return to the privilege level of the invoking user.