Double Decoding of the Same Data
Draft Variant
Structure: Simple
Description
The product decodes the same input twice, which can limit the effectiveness of any protection mechanism that occurs in between the decoding operations.
Common Consequences 1
Scope: Access ControlConfidentialityAvailabilityIntegrityOther
Impact: Bypass Protection MechanismExecute Unauthorized Code or CommandsVaries by Context
Potential Mitigations 4
Phase: Architecture and Design
Strategy: Input Validation
Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Output Encoding
Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.
Phase: Implementation
Strategy: Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (Double Decoding of the Same Data). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Observed Examples 6
CVE-2004-1315Forum software improperly URL decodes the highlight parameter when extracting text to highlight, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code by double-encoding the highlight value so that special characters are inserted into the result.
CVE-2004-1939XSS protection mechanism attempts to remove "/" that could be used to close tags, but it can be bypassed using double encoded slashes (%252F)
CVE-2001-0333Directory traversal using double encoding.
CVE-2004-1938"%2527" (double-encoded single quote) used in SQL injection.
CVE-2005-1945Double hex-encoded data.
CVE-2005-0054Browser executes HTML at higher privileges via URL with hostnames that are double hex encoded, which are decoded twice to generate a malicious hostname.
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Implementation
Related Weaknesses
Taxonomy Mapping
- PLOVER
Notes
Research GapProbably under-studied.