Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')

Incomplete Variant
Structure: Simple
Description

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype.

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies attributes that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control modifications of attributes of the object prototype.
Common Consequences 2
Scope: ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability

Impact: Read Application DataModify Application Data

This weakness is usually exploited by using a special attribute of objects called proto, constructor, or prototype. Such attributes give access to the object prototype. An attacker can inject attributes that are used in other components by adding or modifying attributes of an object prototype. This creates attributes that exist on every object, or replace critical attributes with malicious ones. This can be problematic if the product depends on existence or non-existence of certain attributes, or uses pre-defined attributes of the object prototype (such as hasOwnProperty, toString, or valueOf).

Scope: Availability

Impact: DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart

An attacker can override existing attributes with ones that have incompatible type, which may lead to a crash.

Potential Mitigations 5
Phase: Implementation
By freezing the object prototype first (for example, Object.freeze(Object.prototype)), modification of the prototype becomes impossible.

Effectiveness: High

Phase: Architecture and Design
By blocking modifications of attributes that resolve to object prototype, such as proto or prototype, this weakness can be mitigated.

Effectiveness: High

Phase: Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

When handling untrusted objects, validating using a schema can be used.

Effectiveness: Limited

Phase: Implementation
By using an object without prototypes (via Object.create(null) ), adding object prototype attributes by accessing the prototype via the special attributes becomes impossible, mitigating this weakness.

Effectiveness: High

Phase: Implementation
Map can be used instead of objects in most cases. If Map methods are used instead of object attributes, it is not possible to access the object prototype or modify it.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Demonstrative Examples 1

ID : DX-206

This function sets object attributes based on a dot-separated path.

Code Example:

Bad
JavaScript
javascript
This function does not check if the attribute resolves to the object prototype. These codes can be used to add "isAdmin: true" to the object prototype.

Code Example:

Bad
JavaScript
javascript
By using a denylist of dangerous attributes, this weakness can be eliminated.

Code Example:

Good
JavaScript
javascript

// Ignore attributes which resolve to object prototype* if (attr === "proto" || attr === "constructor" || attr === "prototype") {

javascript
Observed Examples 4
CVE-2018-3721Prototype pollution by merging objects.
CVE-2019-10744Prototype pollution by setting default values to object attributes recursively.
CVE-2019-11358Prototype pollution by merging objects recursively.
CVE-2020-8203Prototype pollution by setting object attributes based on dot-separated path.
References 2
Prototype pollution attack in NodeJS application
Olivier Arteau
15-05-2018
ID: REF-1148
What is Prototype Pollution?
Changhui Xu
30-07-2019
ID: REF-1149