Missing Protection Mechanism for Alternate Hardware Interface

Draft Base
Structure: Simple
Description

The lack of protections on alternate paths to access control-protected assets (such as unprotected shadow registers and other external facing unguarded interfaces) allows an attacker to bypass existing protections to the asset that are only performed against the primary path.

Extended Description

An asset inside a chip might have access-control protections through one interface. However, if all paths to the asset are not protected, an attacker might compromise the asset through alternate paths. These alternate paths could be through shadow or mirror registers inside the IP core, or could be paths from other external-facing interfaces to the IP core or SoC. Consider an SoC with various interfaces such as UART, SMBUS, PCIe, USB, etc. If access control is implemented for SoC internal registers only over the PCIe interface, then an attacker could still modify the SoC internal registers through alternate paths by coming through interfaces such as UART, SMBUS, USB, etc. Alternatively, attackers might be able to bypass existing protections by exploiting unprotected, shadow registers. Shadow registers and mirror registers typically refer to registers that can be accessed from multiple addresses. Writing to or reading from the aliased/mirrored address has the same effect as writing to the address of the main register. They are typically implemented within an IP core or SoC to temporarily hold certain data. These data will later be updated to the main register, and both registers will be in synch. If the shadow registers are not access-protected, attackers could simply initiate transactions to the shadow registers and compromise system security.

Common Consequences 1
Scope: ConfidentialityIntegrityAvailabilityAccess Control

Impact: Modify MemoryRead MemoryDoS: Resource Consumption (Other)Execute Unauthorized Code or CommandsGain Privileges or Assume IdentityAlter Execution LogicBypass Protection MechanismQuality Degradation

Potential Mitigations 3
Phase: Requirements
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Phase: Architecture and Design
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Phase: Implementation
Protect assets from accesses against all potential interfaces and alternate paths.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

Demonstrative Examples 1

ID : DX-176

Register SECURE_ME is located at address 0xF00. A mirror of this register called COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is at location 0x800F00. The register SECURE_ME is protected from malicious agents and only allows access to select, while COPY_OF_SECURE_ME is not. Access control is implemented using an allowlist (as indicated by acl_oh_allowlist). The identity of the initiator of the transaction is indicated by the one hot input, incoming_id. This is checked against the acl_oh_allowlist (which contains a list of initiators that are allowed to access the asset). Though this example is shown in Verilog, it will apply to VHDL as well.

Code Example:

Informative
Verilog

module foo_bar(data_out, data_in, incoming_id, address, clk, rst_n); output [31:0] data_out; input [31:0] data_in, incoming_id, address; input clk, rst_n; wire write_auth, addr_auth; reg [31:0] data_out, acl_oh_allowlist, q; assign write_auth = | (incoming_id & acl_oh_allowlist) ? 1 : 0; always @*

verilog

Code Example:

Bad
Verilog

assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00) ? 1: 0;

The bugged line of code is repeated in the Bad example above. The weakness arises from the fact that the SECURE_ME register can be modified by writing to the shadow register COPY_OF_SECURE_ME. The address of COPY_OF_SECURE_ME should also be included in the check. That buggy line of code should instead be replaced as shown in the Good Code Snippet below.

Code Example:

Good
Verilog

assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00 || address == 32'h800F00) ? 1: 0;

Observed Examples 5
CVE-2022-38399Missing protection mechanism on serial connection allows for arbitrary OS command execution.
CVE-2020-9285Mini-PCI Express slot does not restrict direct memory access.
CVE-2020-8004When the internal flash is protected by blocking access on the Data Bus (DBUS), it can still be indirectly accessed through the Instruction Bus (IBUS).
CVE-2017-18293When GPIO is protected by blocking access to corresponding GPIO resource registers, protection can be bypassed by writing to the corresponding banked GPIO registers instead.
CVE-2020-15483monitor device allows access to physical UART debug port without authentication
Applicable Platforms
Languages:
Not Language-Specific : Undetermined
Technologies:
Microcontroller Hardware : UndeterminedProcessor Hardware : UndeterminedBus/Interface Hardware : UndeterminedNot Technology-Specific : Undetermined
Modes of Introduction
Architecture and Design
Implementation